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Abstract: Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle
that classical physics (be it point-like analytic, statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us
to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a consequence of
the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the
ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode
of  assignment  of  states  to  physical  systems (unit  state  vectors  versus  non-idempotent
density  operators)  we  distinguish  between  strong/relational  and  weak/deconstructional
forms of quantum nonseparability. The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at
length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality in forming a coherent
picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also
considered.  Finally,  certain  philosophical  consequences  of  quantum  nonseparability
concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question of realism in quantum mechanics,
and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its entirety are
explored.
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1.   Part and Whole in Classical Mechanics
An unambiguous discussion of the part-whole relation in classical physics  namely, the
relation between a compound system and its constituent subsystems with respect to the
interconnection of their properties  requires the technical conception of the formulation of
a compound system on the state space of classical mechanics. We briefly note in this respect
that in the case of point-like analytic mechanics, the state of a compound system consisting
of N point particles is specified by considering all pairs {q3N(t), p3N(t)} of the generalized
position and momentum coordinates of the individual particles.  Hence,  at  any temporal
moment t, the individual pure state of the compound system consists of the N-tuple ω = (ω1,
ω2, ... , ωΝ), where {ωi}= {qi, pi} are the pure states of its constituent subsystems. It is then
clear  that  in  the  individual,  analytical  interpretation  of  classical  mechanics  maximal
knowledge of the constituent parts of a compound system provides maximal knowledge of
the whole system (see, for example, Scheibe, 1973, pp. 53-54). Accordingly, every property
the compound system has at time t, if encoded in ω, is determined by {ωi}. For instance,
any  basic  physical  quantities  (such  as  mass,  momentum,  angular  momentum,  kinetic
energy, center of mass motion, etc.) pertaining to the overall system are determined in terms
of the corresponding quantities of its  parts.  They simply constitute  direct sums of the
relevant quantities of the subsystems. Thus, they are wholly specified by the subsystem
states. This is a direct consequence of the application of the conservation laws to the parts
and the whole of a classical system and the requirement of additivity of the conserved
mechanical quantities. Furthermore, derived quantities, such as the gravitational potential
energy, that are not additive in the same simple way as the aforementioned basic quantities,
can be explicitly calculated in terms of them. In fact,  any derived quantity in classical
physics, given its general mathematical expression, can be determined in terms of additive,
basic physical quantities, i.e. one-point functions, whose values are well specified at each
space-time point.
     The foregoing concise analysis delimits the fact, upon which the whole classical physics
is founded, that any compound physical system of a classical universe can be conceived of
as consisting of separable, distinct parts interacting by means of forces, which are encoded
in the Hamiltonian function of the overall system, and that, if the full Hamiltonian is known,
maximal knowledge of the values of the physical quantities pertaining to each one of these
parts  yields an exhaustive knowledge of the whole compound system. In other words,
classical  physics  obeys  a  separability  principle that  can be expressed schematically  as
follows:
Separability Principle: The states of any spatio-temporally separated subsystems S1,
S2, ..., SN of a compound system S are individually well defined and the states of the
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compound system are wholly and completely determined by them and their physical
interactions including their  spatio-temporal relations (cf.  Howard,  1989; Healey,
1991).
     Let us now briefly consider the behaviour of the states of a compound system in classical
statistical  mechanics  in  relation  to  the  aforementioned  separability  principle.  In  the
statistical  framework of classical  mechanics,  the states  of a  system are  represented by
probability  measures  μ(B),  namely,  non-negative  real-valued  functions  defined  on
appropriate Borel subsets of phase space. Since the pure state ω of an individual classical
system  cannot  be  known  with  absolute  precision,  μ(B) is  simply  interpreted  as  the
probability that the individual pure state ω is more likely to be in the Borel set B of phase
space than in others. Consequently, a classical statistical state merely represents an estimate
for the pure state of an individual system, where the probability measure  μ describes the
uncertainty of our estimation. It can now easily be shown that given the statistical state μ of
a  compound  system,  the  states  {μi},  i  =  1,2,  ...,  N  ,  of  its  subsystems are  uniquely
determined  by  μ.  In  classical  theories  the  set  of  all  statistical  states  (i.e.,  probability
measures) is a  simplex, so that every statistical state is the resultant of a unique measure
supported by its constituent pure states (e.g.,  Takesaki, 1979, ch. IV6).  In other words,
every classical statistical state admits a  unique decomposition into mutually disjoint pure
states, which, in turn, can be interpreted epistemically as referring to our knowledge about
an  individual  system.  Thus,  every  classical  statistical  state  specifies  in  fact  a  unique
ensemble of pure states in thorough harmony with the separability principle of classical
physics.
     We finally note with respect to the classical  field-theoretical viewpoint,  including
general relativity, that it does conform to the aforementioned separability principle. The
essential characteristic of any field theory, regardless of its physical content and assumed
mathematical structure, is that the values of fundamental parameters of a field are well-
defined at every point of the underlying manifold (e.g., Einstein, 1971, pp. 170-171). For
instance, exhaustive knowledge of the ten independent components of the metric tensor at
each point within a given region of the space-time manifold, completely determines the
gravitational field in that region. In this sense, the total existence of a field in a given region
is contained in its parts, namely, its points. Thus, in attributing physical reality to point-
values of basic field parameters, a field theory proceeds by tacitly assuming that a physical
state is ascribed to each point of the manifold, and this state determines  the local properties
of this point-system. Furthermore, the compound state of any set of such point-systems is
completely  determined  by  the  individual  states  of  its  constituents.  Consequently,  the
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separability principle is incorporated in the very structure of field theories; in other words,
classical field theories necessarily satisfy the separability principle.
2. Part and Whole in Quantum Mechanics
In  contradistinction  to  classical  physics,  standard  quantum  mechanics  systematically
violates the conception of separability.1 The source of its defiance is due to the tensor-
product structure of Hilbert-space quantum mechanics and the superposition principle of
states. As a means of facilitating the discussion, we shall mostly consider in the sequel the
simplest case of a compound system S consisting of a pair of subsystems S1 and S2, since
the extension to  any finite number is  straightforward.  In quantum mechanics,  by clear
generalization of the case of an individual system, to every state of a compound system
corresponds a density operator W   a self-adjoint, positive, trace class operator whose
trace is equal to 1   on a tensor-product Hilbert space of appropriate dimensionality. In
particular, to every pure state |Ψ> of the compound system corresponds an idempotent
density operator W=W2, namely, a projection operator P|Ψ>= |Ψ><Ψ| that projects onto the
one-dimensional subspaces H|Ψ> of that product space. 
     If, then, W1 and W2 are density operators corresponding respectively to the quantal states
of a two-component system S1 and S2, the state of the compound system S is represented by
the density operator W = W1⊗W2 on the tensor-product space H1⊗H2 of the subsystem
Hilbert spaces. The most important structural feature of the tensor-product construction,
intimately involved with the nonseparability issue, is that the space H1⊗H2 is not simply
restricted to the topological (Cartesian) product of H1 and H2, but includes it as a proper
subset. This means that although all vectors of the form |ψi>⊗|φj> ({|ψi>}∈H1, {|φj>}∈H2)
belong to the tensor-product space, not all vectors of H1⊗H2 are expressible in this form.
For, by the principle of superposition there must be linear combinations of vectors |ψi>⊗|φj>
+ |ψ′i>⊗|φ′j> + ... , which belong to H1⊗H2, but, cannot, in general, factorise into a single
product. Put it another way, the metric of the tensor-product space ensures that every vector
|Ψ>  ∈ H1⊗H2 can indeed be written as |Ψ> =  ∑ i,j cij (|ψi>⊗|φj>). It does not guarantee,
however, that there exist two sets of complex numbers, {ai} and {bj}, such that cij = aibj. If
this happens, then clearly |Ψ> = |ψi>⊗φj>. In such a case, the state of the compound system
is called a product state: a state that can always be decomposed into a single tensor-product
of an S1-state and an S2-state. Otherwise, it is called a correlated state, or in Schrödinger’s,
1935a, locution, an entangled state.
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     It  is  worthy  to  signify  that  in  quantum mechanics  a  compound system can  be
decomposed, in a unique manner, into its constituent subsystems if and only if the state of
the  compound  system  is  of  a  product  form  (e.g.,  von  Neumann,  1955).  In  such  a
circumstance the constituent subsystems of a compound system behave in an independent
and uncorrelated manner, since for any two physical quantities A1 and A2 pertaining to
subsystems  S1 and  S2,  respectively,  the  probability  distributions  of  A1 and  of  A2 are
disconnected: Tr (W1⊗W2) (A1⊗A2) = Tr (W1 A1)⋅Tr (W2 A2). Thus, correlations among any
physical quantities corresponding to the two subsystems are simply non existent. When
therefore a compound system is represented by a state of product form, each subsystem
possesses an independent mode of existence, namely, a separable and well-defined state, so
that the state of the overall system consists of nothing but the sum of the subsystem states.
Consequently, the state of the whole is reducible to the states of the parts in consonance
with the separability principle of Section 1. This is the only highly particular as well as
idealised case in which a separability principle holds in quantum mechanics.
     For, even if a compound system at a given temporal instant is appropriately described by
a product state, the preservation of its identity under the system’s natural time evolution is,
from a physical point of view, a considerably rare phenomenon. This is evident by the fact
that in order for a compound system to preserve for all times a state of product form  W
(t) = W1(t)  ⊗ W2(t), for all t  ∈ R   its Hamiltonian  H (i.e., the energy operator of the
system) should be decomposed into the direct sum of the subsystem Hamiltonians  H =
H1 ⊗ I2 + I1 ⊗ H2  and this is precisely the condition of no interaction between S1 and S2.
Hence, the slightest interaction among the subsystems of a compound system results in a
state for the overall system that is no longer a product of pure vector states, each of which
would belong to the Hilbert space of the corresponding subsystem. The time development of
the compound system, as determined by the unitary character of Schrödinger’s dynamics,
still transforms pure states into pure states, but, in general, no longer maps product states
into product states. If the physically allowable set of pure states of a compound system is
not  exhausted by product  states,  then  the  smallest  interaction of  a  subsystem with  its
environment gives rise to an entangled state representation for the whole system. It may
appear, in this respect, that the natural realization of the notion of an entangled state is a
matter of dynamical interaction, since it presupposes its involvement. As we will argue in
Section 5,  however,  the  origin  of quantum entanglement  is  of  kinematical  rather  than
dynamical nature. This constitutes a fact of fundamental importance and also the riddle of
the problem of nonseparability in quantum mechanics.
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3.   Strong/Relational Form of Nonseparability
3.1  Let us then consider a compound system S consisting of two subsystems S1 and S2 with
corresponding Hilbert spaces H1 and H2. Naturally, subsystems S1 and S2, in forming system
S, have interacted by means of forces at some time t0 and suppose that at times t > t0 they
are spatially separated. Then, any pure state W of the compound system S can be expressed
in the tensor-product Hilbert space in the Schmidt form
                W = P|Ψ> = |Ψ><Ψ| = ∑i ci (|ψi>⊗|φi>),          || |Ψ> ||2 = ∑i |ci|2 = 1 ,                (1)
where  {|ψi>}  and  {|φi>}  are  orthonormal  vector  bases  in  H1 (of  S1)  and  H2 (of  S2),
respectively. The prominent fact about representation (1) is that it involves only a single
summation. It was introduced in this context by Schrödinger, 1935a, in an informal manner
in his famous ‘cat paradox’ paper.
     Obviously, if there is just one term in the W-representation of the compound system, i.e.,
if |ci| = 1, the state W = |ψ>⊗|φ> is a product state and thus represents an individual state of
S. If, however, there appear more than one term in W, i.e., if |ci|  < 1, then there exist
correlations between subsystems S1 and S2. It can be shown in this case that there are no
subsystem states |ξ> (∀ |ξ>∈H1)  and |χ> (∀ |χ>∈H2)  such that W is equivalent to the
conjoined attribution of |ξ> to subsystem S1 and |χ> to subsystem S2, i.e., W ≠ |ξ> ⊗ |χ>.2
     Thus,  when a compound system such as S is  in an entangled state W, namely a
superposition of pure states of tensor-product forms, neither subsystem S1 by itself nor
subsystem S2 by itself is associated with an individual definite state. The normalised unit
vectors |ψi>, |φi> belonging to the Hilbert space of either subsystem are not eigenstates of
W. If descriptions of physical systems are restricted to the state vector assignment of states,
then, strictly speaking, subsystems S1 and S2 have no states at all, even when S1 and S2 are
spatially separated. Only the compound system is in a definite pure state W, represented
appropriately by a state vector in the tensor-product Hilbert space of S. Maximal knowledge
of  the  whole  system,  therefore,  does  not  allow  the  possibility  of  acquiring  maximal
knowledge of its component parts, a circumstance with no precedence in classical physics.
     Since on the state vector ascription of states, neither subsystem S1 nor subsystem S2 has a
state  vector  in  S,  it  is  apparent  that  the  state  W of  the  compound system cannot  be
reproduced on the basis that neither part has a state. Thus, the separability principle of
Section 1 is flagrantly violated. In this respect, the entangled state W establishes a certain
kind of quantum nonseparability that  we call  strong nonseparability.  On this  view an
extended compound system is, strictly speaking, an individual quantum system that consists
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of ‘no parts’. The last expression should be understood in the sense that the ‘parts’ are
assigned  no definite states. By means of a maxim, strong nonseparability  may be described
by saying that ‘there exists only the ‘whole’ and not the ‘parts’’ or ‘the ‘parts’ are devoid of
their individuality’. Strong nonseparability casts severe doubts on the existence of isolated
(sub)systems and the applicability of the notion of atomism, in the sense that the parts of a
quantum whole no longer exist as precisely defined individual entities (in this connection,
see also the ending of Section 4.1).
3.2  Alternatively,  when considering  an  entangled  compound system such  as  S,  each
subsystem S1 [S2] may be regarded to ‘have’ a state, but at the expense of being specified
only when reference is made to the partner subsystem S2 [S1], via the total information
contained in S. Accordingly, each subsystem may be viewed to derive its existence only
from its ‘behaviour pattern’ within the whole. To express this part-whole relation clearly, let
us consider an important class of compound quantum systems that form the prototype of
EPR-correlated systems, namely,  spin-singlet  pairs.  Let  then S  be a compound system
consisting of a pair (S1, S2) of spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state
W = 1/√2 {|ψ+> ⊗ |φ->  −  |ψ-> ⊗ |φ+>},
where {|ψ± >} and {|φ± >}are orthonormal bases in the two-dimensional Hilbert spaces H1
and H2 associated with S1 and S2, respectively. In such a case, it is quantum mechanically
predicted and experimentally confirmed that the spin components of S1 and of S2 have
always  opposite  spin  orientations;  they  are  perfectly  anticorrelated.  Whenever  the spin
component of S1 along a given direction is found to be +1/2  (correspondingly −1/2 ),
then the spin component of S2 along the same direction must necessarily be found to be –1/2
 (correspondingly +1/2 ), and conversely. Moreover, due to the rotational invariance of
the spin-singlet state, this holds independently of the choice of direction with respect to
which the state of spin is expressed. 
     The spin-singlet pair of particles (S1, S2) clearly establishes nonseparability. Particles S1
and S2,  after  they have interacted in the past to form the compound system S,  remain
anticorrelated (maximally entangled) even if  they are  spatially separated and  no longer
interacting. The state W of the system they formed cannot be reproduced by the states of its
parts and their spatio-temporal relationships.3 Subsystems S1 and S2 are correlated in a way
that is encoded in the state W of the overall system. The interrelation, the mutual adaptivity
between the parts (S1, S2), cannot be disclosed in an analysis of the parts that takes no
account  of the entangled connection of the whole.  Their  interlocking  relation does not
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supervene upon any intrinsic or relational properties of the parts taken separately. It may
seem odd to consider nonsupervenient relations holding between nonindividuatable relata.
However,  the important point to be noticed is that within the context of the foregoing
analysis  the nature and properties of the parts  are  determined from their  ‘role’   the
forming pattern of the inseparable web of relations   within the whole. Here, the part-
whole relationship appears  as  complementary:  the part  is  made ‘manifest’  through the
whole, while the whole can only be ‘inferred’ via the interdependent behaviour of its parts.
Thus, in the example under consideration, the property of total spin of the whole in the
singlet  state does indicate the way in  which the parts  are  related with respect  to spin,
although  neither  part  possesses  a  definite  numerical  value  of  spin  in  any  direction  in
distinction from the other one. And it is only the property of the total spin of the whole that
contains  all that can be said about the spin properties of the parts, because it is only the
whole that contains the correlations among the spin probability distributions pertaining to
the parts.  The same goes  of course for  the properties  of total  momentum and relative
distance of the whole with respect to the corresponding local properties of its parts. This
part-whole relationship we call, after Teller, 1986,  relational nonseparability constituting
an immediate aspect of the strong kind of quantum nonseparability.4
     It should be underlined that analogous considerations to the paradigmatic case of the
singlet state apply to any case of quantum entanglement.  Entanglement need not be of
maximal anticorrelation, as in the example of spin-singlet pairs. It does neither have to be
confined  to  states  of  quantum  systems  of  the  same  kind.  As  noted  in  Section  2,
entanglement reaches in principle the states of all quantum systems; it is ubiquitous among
them (see  also,  for  instance,  Redhead,  1995,  pp.  61-62).  Consequently,  any  entangled
compound system possess properties which do not reduce to, or supervene on the properties
of its component subsystems. As a means of exemplification, within the spin-singlet state W
of S is encoded the property that S has total spin zero. From a physical point of view, this
derives from the interference (the definite phase interrelations) with which the subsystem
states |ψ> and |φ>  or, more precisely, the two product states |ψ+>⊗|φ->, |ψ->⊗|φ+>  are
combined within W. This, in turn, leads not only to the subsystem interdependence of the
type described above, but also to conservation of the total angular momentum for the pair
(S1, S2) of spin-1/2 particles, and thus to the property of definite total spin of value zero for
the compound system S. 
     The latter is a holistic property of S: it is not determined by any physical properties of its
subsystems S1, S2 considered individually. Specifically, the property of S ‘having total spin
8
zero’ does not supervene on the spin properties of S1 and of S2, since neither S1 nor S2 has
any definite spin in the singlet state. Moreover, the probability distributions concerning spin
components of S1 and of S2 along some one direction do not ensure, with probability one,
S’s possession of this property. Neither the latter could be understood or accounted for by
the possibility (that a strict adherent of reductionism may favour) of treating S1 and S2
separately at the expense of postulating a relation between them as to the effect of their spin
components ‘being perfectly anticorrelated’ (see also Healey, 1994). For,  while ‘having
total  spin  zero’  is  an  intrinsic  physical  property  of  the  compound  system  S  in  the
nonseparable state W, the assumed relation is not an intrinsic physical relation that S1 and S2
may have in and of themselves. That is, although the relation of perfect anticorrelation is
encoded within  state  W, ascribing  this  relation to  individual  parts  of  a  system is  not
tantamount to being in state W. The relation of perfect anticorrelation is inherent to the
entangled  state  W itself,  whose  nonseparable  nature  reflects  furthermore  the  quantum
exclusion principle for half-integer spin particles.
     This is precisely the delicate point with entangled correlations in Hilbert-space quantum
mechanics: they cannot be explained in terms of preassigned relations or interactions among
the parts; their existence cannot be traced back to any interactions. As aforementioned in
Section 2,  whereas interaction gives rise to entanglement,  entanglement  itself needs no
recourse  to  interaction  for  its  being  established.  Interaction  is  a  sufficient  but  not  a
necessary condition for entanglement. Quantum entanglement does occur in the absence of
any interactions. Due to that the entangled correlations among the states of various physical
systems do not acquire the status of a causally dependent relation (cf. Scheibe, 1991, p.
228). Their delineation is rather determined by the entangled quantum state itself which
refers directly to the whole system.  Thus,  we are  confronted with a  genuine  quantum
mechanical instance of holism: there exist properties of entangled quantum systems which,
in a clearly specifiable sense, characterise the whole system but are neither reducible to nor
implied by or causally dependent on the local properties of its parts. 
4.   Weak/Deconstructional Form of Nonseparability
4.1   In view of the radical form of nonseparability on the state vector ascription of states, it
is  interesting  to  inquire  whether  the  assignment  of  statistical  states  to  component
subsystems,  represented  by  non  idempotent  density  operators,  restores  a  notion  of
separability into quantum theory? The question, contrary to some recently expressed views,
is answered strictly in the negative.
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     Although such a response could be formulated in a quite general manner, the clearest
way to see this, for present purposes, is by regarding again as the state W of a compound
system the singlet state of a pair of spin-1/2 particles (S1, S2) in the familiar development
                                      W = 1/√2 {|ψ+> ⊗ |φ-> − |ψ-> ⊗ |φ+>}.                                       (2)
Observe, in consonance with the considerations of Section 3.1, that neither particle S1 nor
particle S2 can be represented in W of Eq. (2) by a state vector. However, each particle may
be assigned a state, albeit a reduced state, that is given by the partial trace of the density
operator W of the compound system. Recall that the reduced state of each particle arises by
‘tracing over’ the degrees of freedom associated with the Hilbert space representation of the
partner particle. Hence, the following density operators
                      Ŵ1 = 1/2 P|ψ+> + 1/2 P|ψ->     and     Ŵ2 = 1/2 P|φ+> + 1/2 P|φ->                      (3)
represent the reduced (‘unpolarized’) states of spin-1/2 particles S1 and S2, respectively, in
state W.
     It is not hard to show, however, that the component states Ŵ1 and Ŵ2 of (3) could be
identical if derived from a compound state W′ that would correspond to the triplet state
W′ = 1/√2 {|ψ+> ⊗ |φ->  +  |ψ-> ⊗ |φ+>},
or to the following pure states (proviso the sign)
W′′ = 1/√2 {|ψ+> ⊗ |φ+>  ±  |ψ-> ⊗ |φ->}
that yield, in general, different predictions than W or W′ does for certain spin measurements
of both S1 and S2 along a given direction; or they still could be identical if derived from the
mixed state
W′′′ = 1/2 {|ψ+> ⊗ |φ->  +  |ψ-> ⊗ |φ+>}.
Thus, given the states Ŵ1 and Ŵ2 of subsystems S1 and S2, respectively, the compound state
could equally well be either W or W′, W′′, W′′′ or in numerous other variations of them.
There exists a many-to-one mapping of the subsystem non-pure states to the state of the
whole system.5 Accordingly, the specification of the compound system remains indefinite.
For, the compound state W contains correlations between subsystems S1 and S2 that the
reduced  states  Ŵ1 and  Ŵ2 do  not  contain.  The  sort  of  correlations  that  is  missing
corresponds,  from a  formal  point  of  view,  to  the  tracing  out  in  the  specification,  for
instance, of Ŵ1 of what might be known about the state of subsystem S2 and about its
connection with subsystem S1.  It is evident, therefore, that at the level of description in
terms of a reduced state, the information obtained by considering, even simultaneously, the
two subsystems does not permit the reconstruction of the pure state of the whole system. In
this sense, it may be said that the ‘whole’ (e.g., system S) is, in a non-trivial way, more than
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the combination of its ‘parts’ (e.g., subsystems S1 and S2), this being the case even when
these parts occupy remote regions of space however far apart. We shall be referring to this
state of affairs by using the term weak nonseparability. The usage of this term is justified by
the fact that although on the density operator ascription of states each subsystem possess a
state independently of the other, still the state of the whole system fails to be exhausted by a
specification of the states of the parts and their permissible correlations, bearing in mind
that  a ‘part’  or a  ‘subsystem’ within a  holistic quantum system acquires  no individual
independent existence.
     To clarify this latter point further, we emphasise that a subsystem state of a compound
(entangled) system can be determined only by means of a non-pure state; in fact, a non-pure
reduced state. Observe, for instance, in the case under consideration, that the compound
state  W of  Eq.  (2)  is  an  entangled pure  state;  yet  each  of  the  subsystems  considered
individually can only be specified up to the non-pure states of (3). The latter arise as a
restriction of the overall pure state of the compound system to the observables pertaining to
a component subsystem.6 Any subsystem state in this situation is exclusively defined at the
level of the overall system; there is no individual state for a component subsystem alone.
For, there exists no justification in regarding the prescribed reduced states of Eq. (3) as
being associated with any specific ensemble of pure states with corresponding eigenvalue
probabilities. The reference of a reduced state is only of a statistical, epistemic nature. It
simply reflects  the statistics derived by a series of measurements performed on a given
component subsystem. As a result, the ascription of a reduced state to a subsystem either
presupposes the suppression or assumes negligence of the entangled correlations between
subsystems or (sub)systems and their environments. In fact, whenever the pure entangled
state of a compound system is decomposed in order to represent subsystems, the effect is a
representation in terms of reduced (statistical) states of those subsystems.
4.2   Acknowledging as a starting point the fact that the nonpurity of a (sub)system’s state is
due to the breaking of the entangled correlations between the (sub)system concerned and its
environment, a certain version of quantum nonseparability arises that may be called, for
present purposes,  deconstructional. It is a conception of nonseparability of the weak kind
that transcends the deeply seated presupposition of a whole consisting of given parts which
then abide by some form of relation to the whole. In adopting a ‘top-down’ thinking, the
notion of deconstructional nonseparability is based on the fact that the decomposition of a
whole into elementary constitutive parts is not, in general, unique.
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     It is a formal feature of Hilbert-space quantum mechanics that given N appropriate
systems S1, S2, ..., SN we can construct uniquely (up to an isomorphism) a compound system
S =  ∑Ni=1 Si on the tensor-product Hilbert  space H of the subsystem spaces Hi.  Given,
however, a compound system S, how can we decompose the corresponding Hilbert space H
as a tensor-product H=H1⊗H2 ⊗...   ⊗HN of the subsystem spaces Hi,  and such that an
observable A of S can be expressed in the canonical form A=A1⊗A2 ⊗...  ⊗AN of suitable
observables  of  the  subsystems  Si?  Apparently,  in  quantum  mechanics  there  are  no
reasonable criteria that would guarantee the  uniqueness or even the  existence  of such a
tensor-product decomposition of the whole system into its component subsystems (e.g.,
Primas, 1993; 1994).  On the operational level of description, the question of existence
presupposes  the  feasibility  of  the  kinematical  independence  between  a  component
subsystem of interest and an appropriate measuring system (including its environment), or
more generally,  it  presumes the separation between the observer  and the observed,  the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge.
     Recall that from a fundamental viewpoint of quantum theory the physical world appears
to us  as  an unbroken whole.  It  does not  present  itself  already separated.  We have to
separate it. In order to be able to obtain any kind of description, to speak about an object, or
refer  to  experimentally  accessible  facts  the  underlying  wholeness  of  nature  should  be
decomposed into interacting but disentangled subsystems, namely into measured objects
and uncorrelated observers  (measuring apparata) with no (or insignificantly  so) holistic
correlations among them. This subject-object separation is sometimes metaphorically called
the Heisenberg cut (e.g., Heisenberg, 1958, p. 116).
     The presuppositions of the latter are automatically satisfied in classical physics,  in
consonance  with  the separability  principle  of Section 1.  In  a  nonseparable  theory like
quantum mechanics, however, the concept of the Heisenberg cut acquires the status of a
methodological regulative principle through which access to empirical reality is rendered
possible. The innovation of the Heisenberg cut, and the associated separation of a quantum
object from its environment, is mandatory for the description of measurements. It is, in fact,
necessary for the operational account of any directly observable pattern of empirical reality.
The  very  possibility  of  devising  and  repeating  a  controllable  experimental  procedure
presupposes the existence of such a subject-object separation. Without it the concrete world
of material facts and data would be ineligible; it would be conceived in a totally entangled
manner.
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     The feasibility of applying a Heisenberg cut depends critically on a suitable tensor-
product  decomposition of material  reality.  In  the  mathematical  framework of  quantum
mechanics, the latter is not given a priori according to the demands of an Archimedean
viewpoint, as reductive atomism would normally require. In the formal codification of the
theory there appears neither an intrinsic tensor-product structure, nor a universally valid
principle for determining the kind of the decomposition. On the contrary, the appropriate
choice of the latter is contingent, in a non trivial manner, upon the context of discourse,
namely the idealizations or abstractions that are deliberately made in the scientific process
to distinguish between ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ features (see, especially, Section 6.1). As
Heisenberg, 1971, p. 58, put it, ‘‘what we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to
our method of questioning’’.7 In this respect, what we define as a ‘part’ or as a ‘subsystem’
within a holistic system is simply a specific pattern (represented quantum mechanically by a
non-pure state) that arises by abstracting or cutting through its entangled correlations to the
rest of the world, and this may be done in different ways depending on the adopted method
of questioning, on the chosen context of investigation.     
     However,  this  does  not  imply  that  any  conceivable  contextual  decomposition  is
pertinent. Holistic systems are not in toto vacuous of internal differentiations. The choice of
a tensor-product decomposition does satisfy certain physical constraints resulting from the
dynamics and the initial state of the compound system. In this sense, certain decompositions
of a holistic system into subsystems are more natural, more stable than others.8 For instance,
it appears tenable that the decomposition of the pure state of an electron pair in an EPR-type
situation prior to a measurement  procedure leads naturally to the reduced states of two
single electrons rather than arbitrary other subsystem states or peculiar mixtures of them
after the completion of the measurement. In the generic case, however, and essentially for
systems whose underlying state space is not locally compact (e.g., systems with infinitely
many degrees of freedom), there exists a multitude of physically attainable and physically
non-isomorphic decompositions of a whole into (component) parts.
     Thus, the nonseparable structure of quantum mechanics suggests that for consistency
reasons it  is no longer admissible to speak of a quantum whole as being made out of
elementary components, but rather that it can be decomposed into or can be described 
under suitable circumstances  in terms of such components (Primas, 1998, and references
therein). It is the decomposition which ‘produces’ the possible components of a quantum
whole by means of an experimental intervention that suppresses (or sufficiently minimizes)
the entangled correlations among them. In this sense, it is justified to say that the process of
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decomposition  provides  a  level  of  description  to  which  one  can  associate  a  separable
concept of reality whose elements are commonly experienced as distinct,  well-localised
objects.
5.   The Relation of Nonseparability to Potentiality
In  providing  a  coherent  picture of nature  that  goes  beyond the computational  rules of
current quantum mechanics, it is only natural to investigate as exhaustively as possible into
the source or underlying conditions of quantum nonseparability. From a formal point of
view, accountable for this counter-intuitive feature is both the tensor-product structure of
Hilbert  space  and the  quantum mechanical  principle  of  the  superposition of  states.  In
relation to the former, as has already been noted in Section 2, in the tensor-product Hilbert
space of a compound system, the states which are products of well-defined states of its
constitutive subsystems form a set of measure zero. Thus, strictly speaking, from a quantum
theoretical viewpoint there exist no separate systems in the world, apart from the world
itself. In relation to the latter, the superposition principle typically states that any number of
pure states in Hilbert space can be superposed to generate a new pure state: that is, if |ψ1>, |
ψ2>, ... is an arbitrarily large number of unit vectors in H pertaining to a quantum system,
then any linear combination
            |Ψ> = c1|ψ1> + c2|ψ2> + ... + ck|ψk> + ...       {ci}∈ C,     ∑i |ci|2 = 1 ,                    (4)
constitutes another pure state |Ψ> in H representing also a physically possible state of the
system.
     To disclose the relation of the superposition principle of states to the question of
nonseparability,  the states of a system involved in a superposed vector of the form (4)
should  be  explicitly  interpreted  so  as  to  refer  to  potentially  realised (through  the
measurement process or ‘spontaneously’ in nature) states |ψi>, each possessing a probability
amplitude ci of occurrence. The principle of superposition of states is inseparably linked
with  the  interference  of  such  probability  amplitudes,  cici*,  reflecting  the  nature  of  the
interrelations among the states of a quantal system. Accordingly, any physical variable A
that is associated with a superposed state |Ψ> possess  no definite value at all, rendering
unattainable thereby a Boolean yes-no classification of  A in |Ψ>. In other words, for any
physical variable  A in a superposed state |Ψ> of eigenstates of  A and any proposition  P
concerning  A, it is not true that either  P holds or its complement  I  − P holds. In such a
circumstance, the possible numerical  values of  A are  objectively indeterminate and not
simply unknown. The objectivity of the indeterminacy of  A stems from the fact that the
probabilities of the various possible outcomes or realizations of  A are designated by the
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superposed state itself; a feature with no analogue in classical mechanics. True, a notion of
superposition is also present for classical mechanic systems, but it is of a radically different
nature from any occurring in quantum theory.
     In classical mechanics the only kind of superposition possible for a system is a mixture
of actual, fixed in advance states. No classical mechanic pure state is a superposition of
other pure states (e.g., Gudder, 1970). For, there exists no way of combining a number of
fine-grained cells, idealised as points in phase space, to produce yet another fine-grained
cell and hence a pure state. The classical mechanic states enjoy actual existence. They are
real and not potential. In fact, a distinction between the potentially possible and the actually
realised is rendered obsolete in classical mechanics by virtue of the absence of an element
of chance in the measurement process and the unique (principally causal) determination of
the dynamical evolution at each temporal instant. In classical physics all that is potentially
possible is also realised in the course of time, independently of any measuring interventions.
     It is a distinctive feature of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, that a pure state can
be defined independently of measurement only by a probability distribution of potentially
possible values which pertain to the physical quantities  of a system. In this  sense,  the
quantum state may be construed, regardless of any operational procedures, as representing a
network of potentialities, namely, a field of  potentially possible and not actually existing
events. The double modality used here does not simply mean to characterize a transition
from potentiality to actuality or from a situation of indefiniteness to definiteness. It also
intends to signify that quantum mechanical potentialities condition but do not control the
production of actual events.
     The concept of quantum mechanical potentiality corresponds to the tendency of a
quantum  system  to  display  a  certain  measurement  result  out  of  a  set  of  multiplied
possibilities in case a suitable measurement is made.9 When, for instance, in the standard
EPR-Bohm example,  a  pair  of  particles  (S1,  S2)  is  in  the  spin-singlet  state,  no spin
component of either particle exists in a precisely defined form. All three spin components of
each particle, however, coexist in a  potential form and any one component possess the
tendency of being actualized at  the expense  of the indiscriminacy of the others if  the
associated particle interacts with an appropriate measuring apparatus. As soon as such an
interaction takes place,  for example, at time to,  and the spin component along a given
direction of , say, particle S1 is measured and found equal to +1/2 , the operation of state
vector reduction, due to the destruction of the superposition bonds between the tensor-
product  states  involved,  imparts  to  particle  S2 a  potentiality:  that  of  inducing,  with
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probability one,  the opposite value  −1/2  ,  if  and when,  at  a  time t>to,  particle S2 is
submitted to an appropriate measurement of the same component of spin as S1. Thus, the
spin-singlet state, furnishing the standard EPR-Bohm example, describes the entanglement,
the inseparable correlation of potentialities. 
     The singlet state (as any entangled state) represents in essence a set of potentialities
whose content is not exhausted by a catalogue of actual, preexisting values that may be
assigned to the spin properties of S1 and of S2, separately. It may be worthy to observe in
this connection that in the EPR-Bohm example no spin property of particle S2 enjoyed a
well-defined value prior to the measurement performed on S1 and a different value in the
sequel. The only change occurring in S2 concerns the transition of a spin property from a
potentially possible value to an actually realised value. If the actualized values of all spin
properties of S2 were predetermined, then the behaviour of S2 would be fixed in advance
regardless of any reference to system S1, and vice versa. Consequently the behaviour of the
compound  spin-singlet  pair would  be reducible  to the  behaviour of  its  parts. A sense of
separability would also had been demonstrated if the actualized values of both S1 and S2
were independent or owed their existence to a common cause in the past (e.g., Butterfield,
1989). Thus, quantum mechanical nonseparability is subject to both the actualization of
potentialities and the confinement of actualization to the dictates of correlation.
     The concept of quantum mechanical potentiality should not be classified under an
epistemic category of apprehension. It does not refer to someone’s deficient knowledge as
to the exact nature of a given object, but it belongs to the mode of existence of the object
itself. It characterizes the degree of realisation of a potentially possible event determined by
objective physical  conditions,  namely,  by  the internal  properties  of  the  object  and the
specified experimental conditions. Quantum mechanical potentialities are physically real
and objective not only in the sense of designating the disposition of an object to expose
certain properties when submitted to given conditions, but also in the sense of interfering,
under certain circumstances as in quantum coherence or quantum entanglement, with one
another (cf. Heisenberg, 1958, p. 185; Popper, 1980, p. 309).
     Thus, when confronting a compound system in an entangled state, one may conceive that
the potentialities of subsystems S1 and S2, consisting the whole system, interfere with each
other in such a way that the probability of a certain result of  a measurement performed on
S1 is dependent upon the result of a measurement performed on S2, and conversely.10 Or
even more acutely, as exemplified in the physically important case of spin anticorrelation,
the actualization of  an  arbitrary  spin  component  of  S1 entails  the  actualization  of  the
corresponding spin component of S2 with precisely defined value. Numerous experimental
16
results, whose quantitative character is based on a Bell-type inequality, strongly testify that
this aspect of interfering potentialities does take part in nature, even when S1 and S2 are
spatially separated (e.g., Aspect et al., 1982; Tittel et al., 1998). Furthermore, as has been
repeatedly shown, there seems to be no way of utilizing the quantum mechanical transition
from potentiality to actuality for the purpose of establishing a superluminal communication
procedure between S1 and S2 that would violate special relativity.11
     It remains an open problem, however, to provide a detailed description of how this
transition from possible to actual occurs in nature. The problem of the actualization of
quantum mechanical potentialities, known also as the problem of measurement, forms the
fundamental difficulty that pervades all quantum theory since its inception. Despite of the
intense  effort  that  has  been  devoted  to  this  problem and  the  achievement  of  several
significant partial results, there seems to be no straightforward route towards a satisfactory,
fully coherent, solution to the problem (e.g., Karakostas, 1994;  Karakostas and Dickson,
1995).
6. Some Philosophical Consequences
6.1  The context-dependence of objects
Regardless of the multifaceted difficulties encountered within a realistic framework of a
quantum  theory  of  measurement,  and  the  associated  want  of  an  explanation  of  the
potentiality  to  actuality  conversion,  quantum  mechanics  definitely  shows  that
nonseparability constitutes a basic feature of the quantum world. It is worthy to signify that
from a  foundational  viewpoint,  quantum mechanical  nonseparability  and  the  sense  of
quantum holism arising out of it refer to a context-independent, or in D’ Espagnat’s, 1995,
scheme, observer- or mind-independent reality. The latter is operationally inaccessible. It
pertains to the domain of entangled correlations, potentialities and quantum superpositions
obeying a non-Boolean logical structure. Here the notion of an object, whose aspects may
result  in  intersubjective  agreement,  enjoys  no  a  priori  meaning  independently  of  the
phenomenon  into  which  is  embedded.  As  already  noted  in  Section  4.2,  well-defined
separate objects  (and their  environments)  are generated by means of a Heisenberg cut,
namely through the process of a deliberate projection of the holistic non-Boolean domain
into a Boolean context that necessitates the suppression (or minimization) of entangled
correlations  between  the  object-to-be  and  the  environment-to-be  (e.g.,  a  measuring
apparatus). 
     The Heisenberg cut is inevitably contextual. It aims at establishing a regulative link
between  the  conditions  for  an  objective  description  of  experience  and  the  inherently
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nonseparable  structure  of  quantum  mechanics.  Once  Heisenberg’s  cut  is  drawn,  the
kinematic  independence  of  the  measuring  apparatus  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the
knowing subject to record objective information about the object. For, if the state-properties
of the apparatus were entangled with the object under measurement,  then, the resulting
information would be relative. The very definition of physical terms would suffer from an
indefinite regress of measurement-context dependency. In such a circumstance, we would
not  be  able  to  make  sense  of  our  experience,  to  interpret  in  an  exact  manner  the
measurement  results,  or  to  interpret  the  formalism predicting  those results   and  the
theoretical description would have no consequences. A precise formulation of concepts
requires the measuring apparatus/knowing subject to be clearly separated from the content
to be represented. This content consists of objects. The subject cannot be regarded as one
more object, admissible to further analysis. It is, rather, the knowing subject that specifies
other things as objects of knowledge. There must be therefore a clear, although artificial,
separation between them so as to allow for intrinsic acts of abstraction, of disassociation, of
stabilization, and finally, of registration. In this sense, a physical system may account as a
measuring  device  (an  extension  of  the  knowing  subject)  only  if  it  is  not  holistically
correlated or entangled with the object under measurement.
     Consequently, any atomic fact or event that ‘happens’ is raised at the observational level
only  in  conjunction  with  the  specification  of  an  experimental  arrangement12  an
experimental context that conforms to a Boolean domain of discourse  namely to a set of
observables co-measurable by that context. In other words, there cannot be well-defined
events in quantum mechanics unless a specific set of co-measurable observables has been
singled out for the system-experimental context whole (e.g., Landsman, 1995). Or to put it
differently, due to the underlying quantum nonseparability the world appears as a complex
whole. However, once a particular question is put to nature and therefore a given context is
specified the oneness of the whole falls apart into apparent parts. Thus, whereas quantum
wholeness refers to an inner-level of reality, a mind-independent reality that is operationally
elusive, the introduction of a context is related to the  outer-level of reality, the empirical
reality  that  results  as  an  abstraction  in  the  human perception (Karakostas  2003).  The
experimental context offers precisely the conditions on the basis of which a quantum event
manifests  itself.  I.e.,  the  experimental  context  operates  as  a  formative  factor  for  the
production of an event.
     Consequent upon that the nature of quantum objects is a context-dependent issue with
the experimental procedure supplying the physical context, the necessary frame for their
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manifested appearance. This seems to be reminiscent of Kant’s view that the concept of an
object is a condition of the possibility of its being experienced. However this may be, the
meaning of the term reality in the quantum realm cannot be considered to be determined by
what physical objects really are. In fundamental quantum mechanics, there are no objects in
an intrinsic, absolute sense. Quantum mechanics describes material reality in a substantially
context-dependent  manner.  The  classical  idealisation  of  sharply  individuated  objects
possessing intrinsic properties and having an independent reality of their own breaks down
in the quantum domain. Quantum attributes can reasonably be regarded as pertaining to an
object of our interest only within a framework involving the experimental conditions. The
latter provide the necessary conditions whereby we make meaningful statements that the
properties  we  attribute  to  quantum  objects  are  part  of  physical  reality.  Without  the
consideration  of  an  appropriate  context  the  concept  of  a  quantum  object  remains
unspecified.  Or  to  put  the  same in  different  words,  any  determination of  an  object in
microphysics, as far as state-dependent properties are concerned, is meaningful only within
a given context. I.e., objects are context-dependent entities.
     Accordingly quantum objects can not be conceived of as ‘things-in-themselves’, as
‘absolute’ building blocks of reality. Instead, they represent carriers of patterns or properties
which arise in interaction with their experimental context/environment, or more generally,
with the rest of the world; the nature of their existence depends on the context into which
they  are  embedded and  on  the  abstractions  we  are  forced  to  make  in  any  scientific
discussion. As already noted, the perceptible separability and localizability of the contextual
objects of empirical  reality  are  generated by breaking/abstracting  the factually  existing
entangled  correlations  of  the  object  concerned  with  its  environment.  In  this  sense,
contextual quantum objects may be viewed as ‘constructed’, ‘phenomenal’ entities brought
forward by the theory. According to considerations of Section 4, they lack individuality and
permit only an unsharp description in terms of reduced (statistical) states. They are not,
however, inventions of the human mind, nor do they constitute a kind of ‘noumenal’ entities
in the Kantian terminology.13 They reflect objective structural aspects of physical reality
with respect to a certain  preselected context. ‘Noumenal’ entities, on the other hand, are
relevant  only  in  a  situation  without  the  application  of  a  Heisenberg  cut,  without  the
involvement of any subject-object separation, or any observational interaction. Since the
existence of the latter generates contextual objects (‘phenomenal’ entities), ‘noumena’ are
empirically inaccessible, artificial limiting cases of ‘phenomena’. A noumenal entity can
produce no informational content that may be subjected to experimental testing without
itself being transformed to a phenomenal entity.
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6.2  Active Scientific Realism
The context-dependency of quantum objects does not contradict a realistic view of the world
as usually assumed. Scientific realism and quantum nonseparability are not incompatible,
but the relationship between them points to the abandonment of the classical conception of
physical reality and its traditional metaphysical presuppositions, most notably, atomism and
strict ontological reductionism. Due to the substantially context-dependent description of
reality suggested by quantum mechanics, one ought to acknowledge that the patterns of
nature emerge  and become intelligible  through  an  active participation  of  the  knowing
subject that,  by itself,  is not and can not be perspective-independent. In this sense, the
conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory,
calls for a kind of contextual realism that we call active scientific realism.
     Active, since it intends to indicate the contribution of thought to experience; it purposes
to acknowledge the participatory role of the knowing subject in providing the context of
discourse;  as  previously  argued,  the  identification  of  a  specific  pattern  as  an  ‘object’
depends on the process of knowledge, the preselection of an experimental context. And
realism, since it maintains that given a context, concrete objects (structures of reality) have
well-defined  properties  independently  of  our  knowledge  of  them.  According  to  the
conception of active scientific realism, the experienced or empirical reality is a functional
category. Functional to the engaging role of the knowing subject, so that the outer reality is
perceived as not something given a-priori, a ‘ready-made’ objective truth dictated allegedly
by an external point of reference, but as something affected by the subject’s action. The
nonseparable structure of quantum mechanics, the experimentally well-confirmed holistic
features arising out of it,  and the subsequent context-dependent  description of physical
reality conflict with the rather comfortable view that the world’s contents enjoy an intrinsic
and absolute meaning of existence, independent of any involvement of the knowing subject,
only to be ‘discovered’ progressively by him.
     The knowing subject  i.e., the experimenter/observer  is free to choose the aspect of
nature he is going to probe, the question he selects to investigate, the experiment he is about
to perform. The role of the experimenter’s choice is inimitable within the framework of
quantum mechanics. For, firstly, a choice on the part of the experimenter is not controlled or
governed by the laws of contemporary physics,  namely  quantum theory,  secondly,  the
statistical algorithm of the theory can only be applied if a certain experimental context has
first been selected, and, more importantly, thirdly, this element of freedom of choice in
selecting the experimenter a context of discourse leads in quantum mechanics to a gradually
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unfolding picture of reality that is not in general fixed by the  prior part of the physical
world  alone.  According  to  the  physico-mathematical  structure  of  standard  quantum
mechanics, the mere freedom to select the experimental context, to choose the question
asked to nature and specify the timing that is asked, allows the experimenter to exert an
indelible influence on a quantum system. In relation to considerations of Section 5, for
instance, such a denotable influence is exerted on the quantum mechanical potentialities for
the various possible outcomes obtained by measurements on the system. Indeed, given an
initial state vector of a quantum system and the choice of a certain experimental context, the
act of measurement injects into the former an increment of information   a particular
measurement outcome  associated with the specifications of the latter. The determination
of the context characterizes the state vector by a particular subset of potentialities. As soon
as the measurement process is accomplished, only one of the potentialities is actualised at
the expense of all the others, and the initial state vector qualitatively changes corresponding
to a new situation with new possibilities. Thus, in a consequence of measurements, the state
vector  carries  into  the  future  in  an  indelible  non-reversible manner  the  informational
content of the choice of each experimental context and it does so in a way that controls
statistically the potentialities for the occurrence of subsequent outcomes (Karakostas 2004).
     The conception of active scientific realism put forward here aims at precisely capturing
the sense in which the knowing/intentional subject is an effective participant in the physical
world.  It  aims at  appropriately expressing within physics  the sense in which this  is  a
“participatory  universe”,  just  to  recall  Wheeler’s,  1983,  p.  202,  phrase.  In  quantum
mechanics, beyond the selection of an experimental context as an act of cognition on the
part of the experimenter, the experimenter’s volitional decision on what to measure bears
also an indelible consequence in bringing about the elementary phenomenon that appears to
be happening. By way of a generalized example, if A, B and C represent observables of the
same quantum system, so that the corresponding operator A commutes with operators B and
C ([A, B] = 0 = [A, C]), not however the operators B and C with each other ([B, C] ≠ 0),
then the result of a measurement of A depends on whether the experimenter had previously
subjected the system in a measurement of the observable B or in a measurement of the
observable C or in none of them. This may simply be viewed as a lemma of the Kochen and
Specker theorem, 1967, whereas analogous, still more vivid, statements to this consequence
can be made through recent investigations of established effects in quantum theory as the
quantum Zeno effect  and the so-called delayed choice  experiments  (e.g.,  Stapp,  2001;
Tegmark, 2000 and references therein).
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     Thus, quantum mechanics undeniably reveals a sense in which the knowing subject
participates in bringing ‘reality’ into being. The conception of active scientific realism  as
an interpretative, regulative hypothesis to physical science   attempts to incorporate the
human factor into our understanding of reality within which human knowledge forms an
indispensable part. It acknowledges the subject-object inherent engagement by integrating
the subjective human increments into an objectively existing physical reality. There is an
ever growing recognition that the Cartesian ideal of an absolute dichotomy between the
human mind and the external world, allowing no intermediate medium, is fundamentally
flawed (e.g., Smith, 1996). It leads to an alleged construction of decontaminated by human
qualities knowledge  a supposedly perspective-free view of the world  that is deficient
to really understand reality. In contradistinction, active scientific realism attempts to convey
that the actual relation of the knowing subject to a world is neither of absolute dichotomy,
nor of independence or of externality, but of active participancy. Thus in coming to know
the  physical  world,  we  come  to  know  also  ourselves  as  knowers  and  consequently
understand how our perspective affects or contributes to our conceptualization about the
world. And conversely, by knowing how we contribute to the knowledge claims about the
world, we more securely identify the informational content the world itself contributes. In
this view, human subjectivity and scientific objectivity, within the respective limits of their
appropriateness, are no longer contraries; they are jointly achieved.14
6.3  In principle limitation of knowing the whole in its entirety
Although the relation of the knowing subject to a world is reasonably conceived, as we
maintain, as a relation of active participancy, a distinction between subject and object (as
phenomena on the ground) should be drawn within the world. As already noted in Section
6.1, for a scientific description of reality that is amenable to experimental tests a subject/
object  distinction  is  inevitable.  Such  an  induced subject/object  separation  represents  a
necessity  in  any  experimental  science  including  physics.  It  also  constitutes,  more
specifically,  the  condition  upon  which  any  empirically  accessible  aspect  of  entangled
quantum correlations is based. It is both interesting and ironic that all empirical evidence
concerning  quantum nonseparability is  obtained by deliberately ‘eliminating’  that same
nonseparability between the object under study and its instrument of observation. In this
sense, quantum nonseparability cannot be regarded as an ‘observed phenomenon’ per se. It
can only indirectly be demonstrated or inferred in a separable way, conceptually employing
counterfactual reasoning (cf. Atmanspacher, 1994). When the latter is used in Bell-type
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argumentations,  as  for  instance  in  the analysis  of relevant  experimental  tests  of Bell’s
inequalities, contradictions may occur with the statistical predictive rules of quantum theory
leading  to empirically verifiable  situations  that  imply,  in  turn,  the existence  of a  non-
divided, undissectable whole. The formal theory, however, that provides the framework for
the systematization of the empirical results is not capable of revealing or describing the
actual character of this whole. The latter is strictly speaking indescribable in the sense that
any detailed description necessarily results in irretrievable loss of information by dissecting
the otherwise undissectable.
     Thus, although nonseparability as an inherent element of quantum theory clearly implies
that wholeness is a fundamental aspect of the quantum world, nonetheless, neither theory
nor experiment can disclose the exact fabric of this wholeness. In this respect, it can safely
be asserted that reality thought of as a whole is not scientifically completely knowable, or,
at best,  it  is veiled (cf. D’ Espagnat,  1998). It  is, in fact,  not susceptible to immediate
scientific practice; it cannot be the subject-matter of detailed scientific investigation; for, it
can neither  be quantified nor  computed or  measured from the outside.  Any discussion
concerning  the  nature  of  this  undissectable  whole is  necessarily  of  an  ontological,
metaphysical  kind,  the  only  confirmatory  element  about  it  being  the  network  of
interrelations which connect its events. Consequently, we are led to a novel limit on the
ability of scientific cognizance as to the actual character of physical reality in its entirety.
     The common philosophical assumption concerning the feasibility of a panoptical,
Archimedean point of view is rendered illusory in quantum mechanics. In contrast to an
immutable  and  universal  ‘view  from  nowhere’  of  the  classical  paradigm,  quantum
mechanics  acknowledges  in  an  essential  way  a  perspectival  character  of  knowledge.
Quantum mechanics reveals that the hunt of a universal frame of reference for  describing
physical  reality  is  in  vain.  Quantum-mechanical  reality  is  nonseparable  and  her
distinctiveness into facts a matter of context. As argued in Section 6.1, access to the non-
Boolean quantum world is only gained by adopting a particular Boolean perspective, by
specifying a certain Boolean context which breaks the wholeness of nature. Consequently,
the description and communication of results of experiments in relation to the non-Boolean
quantum world presuppose the impossibility of a perspective-independent account, since
one must  at  the outset  single out an experimental  context  (determined by a set  of co-
measurable observables for the context-cum-quantum system whole) and in terms of which
the definite result of a measurement can be realized. 
     Be sure there is only one reality, but every description of it presupposes the adoption of a
particular point of view. There is no such a thing as a ‘from nowhere’ perspective or a
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universal viewpoint. A complete knowledge of the world as a whole would have to provide
an explanation of the perception process or  the pattern recognition mechanisms of the
knowing  subject,  since  this  is  part  of  the  world.  It  would  have  to  include  within  a
hypothetically posited ultimate theory an explanation of the conditions for  observation,
description and communication which  we ourselves,  as  cognizant  subjects,  are  already
subjected to. We cannot transcend them. This would be like attempting to produce a map of
the globe which contained itself as an element. The usage of the metaphor is meant to
convey the conceptually deep fact  reminiscent of Gödel’s famous undecidability theorem
for axiom-systems in mathematics   that a logically consistent theory can not generally
describe its universe as its own object. In particular, the scientific language of our alleged
universal  ultimate  theory  would  have  to  be  semantically  closed,  and  hence  engender
antinomies or paradoxes especially in relation to self-referential descriptions, as in the case
of von Neumann’s account of quantum measurement that leads to an infinite regress of
observing observers (e.g.,  Chiara, 1977; Peres and Zurek, 1982). Be that as it  may, the
assumption of a ‘view from nowhere’ appeared realizable prior to quantum mechanics,
because in classical physics the validity of separability and unrestricted causality led to the
purely reductionist presumption that one could consistently analyze a compound system into
parts and consequently deduce the nature of the whole from its parts. Since the part could be
treated as a closed system separate from the whole, the whole could ultimately be described
 by applying the conservation laws of energy, momentum and angular momentum  as
the sum of its parts and their physical interactions, and hence the knowing subject would
achieve its knowledge of physical reality from the ‘outside’ of physical systems.
     In the quantum theoretical framework that picture is no longer valid. As we have
extensively argued, the consideration of physical reality as a whole   supposedly that a
sense is  ascribed to this word   can not be comprehended as the sum of its parts in
conjunction with the spatiotemporal relations or physical interactions among the parts, since
the quantum whole provides the framework for  the existence of the parts.  Due to the
genuinely  nonseparable  structure  of  quantum  mechanics,  whole  and  parts  mutually
influence and specify each other; the parts are adjusted by the whole, whereas, in turn, the
whole depends on the interconnectedness of its parts. Hence, the legendary notion of the
classical paradigm that wholes are completely describable or explicable in terms of their
parts is no longer defensible. In classical mechanics, given any compound physical system,
the dynamics of the whole was regarded as being reducible to the properties of the parts. In
quantum mechanics the situation is actually reversed; the identity and properties of the parts
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can ultimately  be  accounted  only  in  terms  of  the  dynamics  of  the  whole.  In  a  truly
nonseparable physical system, as in an entangled quantum system, the part does acquire a
different identification within the whole from what it does outside the whole, in its own
‘isolated’,  separate  state  (see  esp.  Secs.  3.2  & 4.1).  Thus, for  instance,  in  the  strong/
relational  view of  nonseparability  no  isolated  spin-1/2  particle,  e.g.  a  ‘free’  or  ‘bare’
electron, can be identified with the spin state of either member of a pair of electrons in the
singlet  state,  whereas,  in  the  weak/deconstructional  view  of  nonseparability  no  state
preparation procedure could have produced such an isolated particle in a  reduced state
whose status against the singlet state is necessarily only of an epistemic nature. So, in either
case, the whole state cannot be regarded as being made up of individual, isolated, separate
particle states.
     When all is said and done, the present situation in physics suggests that the natural
scientist as a conscious being may operate within a mild form of the reductionist paradigm
in trying to analyse complex objects in terms of parts with the absolute certainty, however,
that during the process the nature of the whole will not be disclosed. The value of the
reductionistic concept as a working hypothesis or as a methodological tool of analysis and
research is not jeopardized at this point,15 but ontologically it can no longer be regarded as a
true code of the actual character of the physical world and its contents. Quantum mechanical
nonseparability strongly suggests that the functioning of the physical world cannot just be
reduced to that of its constituents thought of as a collection of interacting but separately
existing localized objects.  Any coherent conceptualization of the physical world that is
compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics requires us to view the world, in the
expression  of  Heisenberg,  1958,  p.  96,  “as  a  complicated  tissue  of  events,  in  which
connections of different kinds alternate or overlay or combine and thereby determine the
texture of the whole”. Although the latter can hardly be fully knowable, an enlightenment of
its actual character may be given by the penetrating power of the theory itself and its future
development. In this respect, it is rather safe to conjecture that the conception of quantum
nonseparability will be an integral part of the next conceptual revolution in physics and may
even be used as a regulative constructive hypothesis guiding the search for the fundamental
physics of the future.
NOTES
1 In  this  work  we  shall  make  no reference  to  alternative  interpretations  of  ordinary  quantum
mechanics as, for instance, Bohm’s ontological or causal interpretation.
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2 In a paper related to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Schrödinger remarked with respect to
this distinctive feature of nonfactorizability as follows: ‘‘When two systems, of which we know the
states by their respective representations, enter into temporary physical interaction due to known
forces between them, and then after a time of mutual influence the systems separate again, then they
can no longer be described in the same way as before,  viz. by endowing each of them with a
representative of its own. ... I would not call that one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum
mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought’’ (Schrödinger,
1935b, §1 ).
3 It is well-known that spin-singlet correlations violate Bell’s, 1964, inequalities. We may note in
this connection the interesting result of  Gisin, 1991, Popescu and Rohrlich,  1992,  that  for any
nonseparable state of a two-component  system there is a proper choice of pairs of observables
whose correlations do violate Bell’s inequality.
4 The significance of correlations as compared to that of correlata is particularly emphasised by
Rovelli, 1996, and Mermin, 1998.
5 Hughston et  al., 1993,  provide a constructive classification of  all  discrete ensembles  of pure
quantum states that correspond to a fixed density operator.
6  A non-pure state is usually addressed  under the term of a mixed state, mainly because both
‘reduced’  and  ‘mixed’ states  correspond mathematically  to a  non-idempotent  density operator.
However, the use of the general term of a mixed state as a substitute of the non-purity of a state is
conceptually misleading. A mixed state, in opposition to a reduced state,  arises as a particular
mixture of different pure states in the (sub)system of interest and thus censures the significance of
entangled correlations. 
7 Similar statements can also be found in the writings of Pauli, 1994, pp. 41, 133.
8 A general explanation of the robustness of certain decompositions of a system as a whole, in terms
of stability  considerations that  could also be  taken into  account  formally,  is  still  lacking.  An
initiatory attempt towards this direction has been recently indicated by Amann and Atmanspacher,
1998.
9  The view that  the quantum state  vector  refers to  ‘possibilities’  or  ‘tendencies’,  as  a  certain
extension of the Aristotelian concept of ‘potentia’, has been advocated by Heisenberg, 1958, pp. 42,
53, in his later writings on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and especially by Fock, 1957,
p. 646. Margenau, 1950, pp. 335-337, 452-454, too has used the concept of ‘latency’ to characterise
the indefinite quantities of a quantum mechanical state that take on specified values when an act of
measurement forces them out of inditermination. Analogous is Popper’s, 1980, ch.9; 1990, ch.1,
understanding of attributing properties to quantum systems in terms of objective ‘propensities’.
Today one of the most eloquent defenders of the appropriateness of the concept of potentiality in
interpreting quantum mechanics is Shimony, e.g. 1993, Vol. 2, ch. 11.
10  The probabilistic dependence  of  measurement  outcomes between  spatially  separated  systems
forming  a  quantum whole  corresponds,  as  an  expression  of  the  violation  of  the  separability
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principle,  to  the  violation  of  what  has  been  coined  in  the  Bell-literature  as  Jarrett’s,  1984,
‘completeness condition’, or equivalently, Shimony’s, 1986, ‘outcome independence’ condition. A
detailed description of these conditions would fall outside the scope of the present work. A review
of them may be found in Shimony, 1990, or more recently in Howard, 1997.
11  A recent generalised version of  the so-called no-signalling theorem is given by Scherer and
Busch, 1993.
12  It  should be  pointed out  that  Bohr  already  on  the  basis  of  his  complementarity  principle
introduced the concept of a ‘quantum phenomenon’  “to refer exclusively to observations obtained
under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experiment” (Bohr, 1963, p. 73).
13 For an elaboration on the distinction between ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’ entities in Kant’s
philosophical scheme, see Allison, 1983.
14 One can hardly resist in recalling at this point Hermann Weyl’s consideration with respect to the
subjective-objective relation. Although Weyl’s reference is within the context of relativity theory,
his remarks are equally pertinent to quantum mechanics as well as to the general relation between
the experiencing subject and the external world. He expressly writes: “The immediate experience is
subjective and absolute. However hazy it  may be, it  is given in its very haziness thus and not
otherwise. The objective world, on the other hand, with which we reckon continually in our daily
lives and which the natural sciences attempt to crystallize by methods representing the consistent
development of these criteria by which we experience reality  in our everyday attitude   this
objective world is of necessity relative; it can be represented by definite things (numbers or other
symbols) only after a system of coordinates [the rest-frame of an observer] has been arbitrarily
carried into the world. It seems to me that this pair of opposites, subjective-absolute and objective-
relative,  contains  one  of  the  most  fundamental insights  which  can  be  gleaned  from science.
Whoever desires the absolute must take the subjectivity and egocentricity into the bargain; whoever
feels drawn towards the objective faces the problem of relativity (Weyl, 1949, p. 116).
15 Quantum holism, as a consequence of nonseparability, should not be regarded as the opposite
contrary of  methodological  reductionism.  Holism is  not  an injunction to  block distinctions.  A
successful holistic research programme has to account apart from nonseparability, wholeness and
unity also for part-whole  differentiation,  particularity  and diversity.  In this  respect, holism and
methodological reductionism appear as complementary viewpoints, none can replace the other, both
are necessary, none of them is sufficient.
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